Corruption Control in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from East Asia

(Cambridge University Press, 2022)

This book challenges the conventional wisdom that autocrats have little incentive or ability to combat corruption by showing that meaningful anti-corruption efforts by authoritarian regimes are more common and more often successful than is widely assumed. Although anti-corruption efforts often have multiple goals, autocrats are most likely to undertake clean-ups when they have ambitious state-building agendas that corruption threatens to undermine. I argue that such efforts are likely to succeed when autocrats are motivated to curb corruption, have broad discretionary power over the operations of the regime, and have sufficient state capacity to implement reforms. Whereas institutional constraints on power are critical for reducing corruption in democracies, the success of authoritarian corruption control often depends on a powerful autocrat having a free hand to enact and enforce measures curbing government wrongdoing. These and other findings are based on a systematic analysis of authoritarian anti-corruption efforts globally since 1950 and deeply researched case studies of China, South Korea, and Taiwan across multiple decades. The book advances our understanding of authoritarian governance and durability and opens up new avenues of inquiry about the politics of corruption control in East Asia and beyond.

Reviewed in: China Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, APSA – Democracy and Autocracy, Developing Economies, New Books Network.

Praise:

“In this provocative, well-researched and wide-ranging book, Carothers shows that autocratic efforts to control corruption are more common, occur for different reasons, and are more often successful than we think. His analysis of anti-corruption drives by different leaders in Taiwan, South Korea, and China sheds new light on the history and contemporary politics of all three places, and his identification of a distinctly authoritarian anti-corruption model is theoretically path-breaking as well as policy-relevant. This challenge to the conventional wisdom deserves to be read carefully, by scholars and policymakers alike.” – Sheena Chestnut Greitens, University of Texas at Austin

“Carothers has written an important book challenging the conventional wisdom that there is a necessary connection between authoritarian government and political corruption. Through both a quantitative analysis and historical case studies, he shows that a number of authoritarian regimes, including Xi Jinping's China, have succeeded in reducing levels of corruption. Highly recommended for both China specialists and governance studies.” – Francis Fukuyama, Stanford University

“Corruption Control in Authoritarian Regimes addresses the classical question of whether dictatorships can curb the predatory behavior of their agents. Carothers’ invaluable comparative study of how three dictatorships in East Asia tackled corruption provides an original and persuasive answer. This book is a major contribution to the literature on corruption in general, and on the political economy of authoritarianism in particular.” – Minxin Pei, Claremont McKenna College

“In a field that is obsessed with showing the obvious, a counterintuitive argument, like the one that autocrats can fight corruption, is both rare and noteworthy.” – Martin Dimitrov, Tulane University

“Shows that autocrats can be effective corruption fighters, provided they are advancing a state-building or revolutionary project that requires cleaning out the bureaucracy, exercising unconstrained personal power, and relying on party or state institutions strong enough to carry out their will.” – Andrew Nathan, Foreign Affairs

"Corruption Control in Authoritarian Regimes is a thought-provoking book that breaks new ground in the study of authoritarianism.” – Yoshinori Nishizaki, National University of Singapore

“Carothers breaks open the black box of authoritarianism to provide much needed insight into the politics of corruption. Whether one wants to learn more about political development and durability in East Asia, or when, how, and why autocrats curb corruption more generally, this book delivers.” – Karrie J. Koesel, University of Notre Dame